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Environmental problems often outstrip the abilities of any single scientist to understand, much less
address them. As a result, collaborations within, across, and beyond the environmental sciences are an
increasingly important part of the environmental science landscape. Here, we explore an insufﬁciently
recognized and particularly challenging barrier to collaborative environmental science: value pluralism,
the presence of non-trivial differences in the values that collaborators bring to bear on project decisions.
We argue that resolving the obstacles posed by value pluralism to collaborative environmental science
requires detecting and coordinating the underlying problematic value differences. We identify ﬁve ways
that a team might coordinate their problematic value differences and argue that, whichever mode is
adopted, it ought to be governed by participatory virtues, pragmatic resolve, and moral concern. Relying
on our experiences with the Toolbox Dialogue Initiative, as well as with other dialogical approaches that
support team inquiry, we defend the claim that philosophical dialogue among collaborators can go a long
way towards helping teams of environmental scientists and fellow travelers detect their problematic
value differences. Where dialogical approaches fare less well is in helping teams coordinate these differences. We close by describing several principles for augmenting philosophical dialogue with other
methods, and we list several of these methods in an appendix with brief descriptions and links for
further learning. Overall, the article makes three main contributions to the research collaboration and
values in science literatures: (1) It deepens our understanding of problematic value pluralism in team
science; (2) It provides actionable guidance and methods for improving values-oriented philosophical
dialogue interventions; and (3) It demonstrates one way of doing engaged philosophy.
Ó 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Good collaborative environmental science (CES) requires
ongoing conversations among collaborators about their values and
how those values might ‘play well together.’ Our goal in this article
is to work out in some detail why such conversations are necessary
and how they might be facilitated by philosophers. To do so we
draw on two literatures that have not interacted as much as they
might. The ﬁrst is work on the nature and facilitation of research
collaborations (e.g., interdisciplinarity, the science of team science,
etc.). The second is ongoing discussions of the roles of values in
science (e.g., Matthew Brown, Kevin Elliot, etc.).

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: laursen3@msu.edu (B.K. Laursen).

We begin, in section 2, by drawing on the research collaboration
literature to summarize the stated beneﬁts and challenges of CES
and to suggest that this literature gives less consideration to the
values of collaborators than it should. This leads us, in section 3, to
use the values in science literature to discuss the ways in which
plural values can undermine the ethical, epistemic, and instrumental goals of research collaborationsda situation we call
“problematically plural values” (PPV). In section 4, we offer a simple
model of two stages required to resolve PPV: collaborators must (1)
detect and (2) coordinate their problematically plural values. Section 5 describes one family of approaches for supporting CES teams
through these two stages: philosophical dialogue interventions.
Then, sections 6 and 7 evaluate how well extant versions of these
interventions fare in providing this assistance. Finally, in section 8,
we identify resources that could augment philosophicallyinformed dialogue in both stages.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.02.004
0039-3681/Ó 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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As the reader may have appreciated from our roadmap, our
emphasis shifts gears at section 5. It quickly moves from a general
solution to a particular approach for implementing the solution.
This move may surprise readers who expect more thought experiments, logical proofs, theoretical triangulation, or historical case
studies to validate our analysis. Our move to a practical solution is
intentional because it models one form of philosophy that we
value: engaged philosophy. In the current mode, philosophers qua
philosophers can apply our philosophical analyses clearly and
immediately to the real-world topics of interest. This mode of
engaged philosophy contributes not only to socio-ecological issues
but also to philosophical knowledge, because application of an
analysis in its target setting is one of the most rigorous tests of its
quality. Thus, our article serves as an example of engaged philosophy of environmental science (see section 5.1; Plaisance & Elliott,
in press).
2. The need for and challenges of doing collaborative
environmental science
2.1. The need for collaborative environmental science
Collaborative environmental science (CES) covers an array of
scientiﬁc practices undertaken by a team of two or more people to
create knowledge about the environment, broadly understood.
Such knowledge is pursued for many reasons ranging from pure
curiosity (basic research) to immediate action (action research).
Collaboration is the norm for conducting environmental science
(Goring et al., 2014), and these collaborators could include academics from different disciplines as well as NGO and agency representatives and community members. The increased prevalence of
CES partially results from the demonstrated epistemic, ethical, and
instrumental advantages of collaboration when addressing complex environmental problems. Epistemically, science teams have
been able to understand more facets of these complex problems
than individuals (Love, 2008). Ethically, participatory (e.g., transdisciplinary) science teams have expanded justice by allowing
direct users of the knowledge to shape the research (Cargo &
Mercer, 2008; Lynn, 2000; Sullivan & Lloyd, 2006). Instrumentally, science teams generally have more equipment, money, locations, and infrastructure than individuals can access alone
(Hagstrom, 1964; Lewis, Ross, & Holden, 2012).
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Mayer et al. (2017) describe an example of plural values interfering with project requirements. They interviewed climate scientists who use computational modeling to assess climate risk
management scenarios. For instance, climate scientists may
attempt an integrated assessment model, which combines information from the environmental and economic sciences to forecast
the consequences of the proposals at hand. But while the model is
an algorithm, the scientiﬁc process is not. There is no established
and detailed recipe for building these models or tools; rather, at
various points of their development, judgment is needed. Mayer
and colleagues show that decisions must be made, and these decisions are, at least often, based on values.
Let’s get speciﬁc. Suppose that one team member is deeply
concerned about the wellbeing of current generations, whereas
another prioritizes the interests of future generations. This difference may manifest itself at various stages of the collaboration. One
is in decisions about how to compare present costs and beneﬁts to
future costs and beneﬁts. How do, say, the costs of cuts in greenhouse gas emissions now compare to the costs of cuts 20 years
down the road? If one collaborator is deeply concerned about
current generations, she may be more inclined to treat future costs
as less signiﬁcant compared to present costs. The second collaborator, on the other hand, may be more apt to treat the two costs as
being on par. The two may therefore disagree about what “discount
rate” to deploy.1 Should the team deploy a 5% discount rate, as is
often used by economists when thinking about climate change?
This would align more closely with the concerns of the ﬁrst
collaborator. Or should the team use perhaps a 1% discount rate, as
found in the widely discussed Stern report?2 This would ﬁt more
closely with the priorities of the second collaborator. This
disagreement could bring the modeling process to a halt, interfering with project progress.3
The example just outlined illustrates possible problems in doing
CES that arise from differences in values held by collaborators. They
are thus examples of the sort that ought to ﬁgure prominently in
the burgeoning literatures of interdisciplinarity and team science.
Indeed, the lists of challenges and barriers to doing collaborative
science in the research collaboration literature is long. They include
institutional obstacles, disciplinary barriers, difﬁculties stemming
from domain-speciﬁcity, and metacognitive hindrances (Brister,
2016; Donovan, 2020; MacLeod, 2018; National Research Council,
2004, National Research Council et al., 2015; P. Robinson,
Genskow, Shaw, & Shepard, 2012; Tuana, 2013). Morse, Nielsen-

2.2. The challenges with collaborative environmental science
But these advantages come with costs arising from inherent
features of collaborative science. One of those inherent features is
value pluralism, a collection of diverse values relevant to the CES
project. In collaborative work, these diverse values are imported
and continue evolving with the collaborators who, even if they are
similar in many ways, will likely hold at least some relevant values
differently.
Value pluralism is both a resource and a hindrance to CES. It is
the diversity of values among collaborators that drives many of the
epistemic, ethical, and instrumental advantages of team research
listed above. This is because in determining what is worth pursuing,
values also establish what is worth paying attention to and developing along the way. The expansion of the team’s attention and
development efforts enables collaborators to seize and build upon
epistemic, ethical, and instrumental opportunities. Despite advantages of value pluralism for CES, it becomes a problem when it
interferes with project requirements. Examples include when value
pluralism interferes with project progress and when it motivates
ethical transgressions. That is, problematic value pluralism can
result in pragmatic and moral failings, among other issues.

1

For philosophical discussion, see Broome (1994).
For more discount rates and the Stern report, see Elliott (2017, pp. 75e77).
A helpful reviewer noted that this exampleddisagreement over two discount
rates due to differential concern for future generationsdmay not exemplify the
difﬁcult value pluralism we seek to describe in this article, because this case is
actually quite easy to resolve by simply running the model with different discount
rates. While the proposed solution is possible, we disagree that it will always, and
easily, resolve the impasse. This is for at least two reasons. First, external project
sponsors may require a clear answer from the study, and two model runs presented
as equally valid would essentially prevent the team from completing the project.
Second, one or both collaborators may have proposed their discount rate on moral
grounds that they are not willing to concede by allowing the other model to move
forward. For example, one collaborator may champion a utilitarian form of
impartiality concerning present and future generations (as in Stern’s 2007 report)
and may thus feel quite strongly that operating with a non-zero discount rate is
wrongdmorally wrong. She may refuse to adopt a “run the model twice”
approach. In any event, as the reviewer helpfully notes, even in cases where a
collaborator’s moral values and beliefs might avail her of the option of running the
model twice, the issue of which discount rate to use is often bound up with a
swarm of beliefs and values. This can make an adequate solution to the disagreement quite difﬁcult to achieve. When conditions like the ones described in this
footnote occur, we are certainly in the realm of disagreements that call for strategies like those discussed in this paper.
2
3
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Table 1
Descriptions and examples of several types of topical and functional values.
Type of Value

Label

Description

Example from CES

Topical

Epistemic

About knowledge and how to get it

Topical

Non-epistemic

About something other than knowledge and
how to get it

Functional

Immediate Enjoyment

Near-term pleasure from an activity or its goal

Functional

Attitudes

Dispositions to consider some things good or
bad

Functional

Desires & Goals

Functional

Guiding Ideals

A (considered or instinctual) attraction to a
future state
Deeply held visions of a perfect future

Functional

Attributes

Functional

Institutional Structures

Functional

Ideologies-Value
Systems-Worldviews

Interconnected, valenced beliefs about many
topics

Functional

Facts

Descriptions of values (not a guide for action but
an observation of the state of affairs)

During the Flint Water Crisis, state scientists did
not value the evidence collected by citizens
(Michigan Civil Rights Commission, 2017;
Valles et al., 2019).
Sustainability researchers undertook the
Coweeta Listening Project to democratize local
science (Burke & Heynen, 2014).
Many environmental scientists in Colorado
communicate their work to the public because
they enjoy it (Andrews, Weaver, Hanley,
Shamatha, & Melton, 2018).
Sustainability scientists must respect the
attitudes of Indigenous scientists toward the
work, e.g., stewardship and caretaking (Whyte
et al., 2015).
Sharing data should be a goal of environmental
science projects (Soranno et al., 2014).
Environmental scientists often use metaphors
that imply an ideal state of nature, e.g., “alien”
species and ecosystem “health” (Carolan, 2006).
Conservation biologists value the diversity
attribute of life (Odenbaugh, 2003).
Equitable and inclusive civic engagement
processes can improve food systems research
and its relationship with policy (Forcone &
Sweeney, 2018).
Environmental scientists in Japan have
extended the open science research worldview
to include principles for community-based
participatory research (Kondo et al., 2019).
Community scholars are learning what Flint, MI,
residents desire in their food system (BelisleToler, Hodbod, & Wentworth, 2020).

Meritorious or worthy qualities of something or
someone
Preferred norms, policies, and strategies for
societal arrangements

Pincus, Force, & Wulfhorst, 2007 list 34 barriers to collaborative
interdisciplinary research. Almost completely missing from these
lists, however, is the sort of values problem at play in our example.4
With that said, there are exceptions. Eigenbrode et al. (2007), for
example, explicitly mention value differences in their discussion of
the barriers and challenges to doing collaborative, interdisciplinary
research. But they emphasize problems that emerge when collaborators have different views about the nature and role of values in
science, viz., the metaphysics and epistemology of values. What is
underemphasized in the research collaboration literature, and what
we think the values in science literature can contribute, is a
nuanced and practical discussion of the problems that emerge
when collaborators’ values themselves directly conﬂict or otherwise violate project requirements like choosing a discount rate.
3. When does value pluralism pose problems for CES?
3.1. Deﬁning value pluralism
Above, we characterized “value pluralism” as a collection of
diverse values relevant to a CES project, but this shorthand is too
vague and self-referential to help us identify when and why value
pluralism causes problems for the project. First, we need to clarify
what "values" are. Given our focus in trying to understand the
impacts of value pluralism on CES practices, we follow Brown
(2020) in deﬁning “values” functionally, that is, by the roles they
play in our scientiﬁc activities. Brown proposes, “Values can be
understood to an extent behaviorally, as the aims, objects, or ends

4
The authors do list “Preference for ‘traditional’ disciplinary work” as a barrier
but it is not named or discussed as a value.

that activity is directed towards” (p.101e102). This is largely
consistent with but sharper than Kevin Elliott’s (2017) deﬁnition,
wherein “Broadly speaking, a value is something that is desirable or
worthy of pursuit” (p.11).
While these two deﬁnitions emphasize what values do, they
also imply what values can be about. That is, according to both,
values have important roles to play in guiding our actions, and they
have contents in domains of human activity. Thus, there are at least
two ways of describing the types of values relevant to CES projects:
by their topical contents and by their functions.5 Each schema helps
to reveal different roots of problems with value pluralism.
In terms of topical content, philosophers of science often start
with a divide between epistemic and non-epistemic values, where
the former refer to values pertaining to knowledge and the latter to
other things. Non-epistemic values therefore cover many, many
topical domains such as the ethical/moral, social, political, and
pragmatic, to name just a few. Such labels pick out topical types of
values. Table 1 gives descriptions and examples of topical-type
values as they may occur in CES projects.
In terms of their functional roles as guides for action, Brown
(2020, pp. 116e123) offers a list of eight types of values. Values
provide:
1. Immediate Enjoyment
2. Attitudes
3. Desires & Goals

5
Tadaki et al. (2017) survey the values literature and distill it into four ways of
deﬁning values: values as (1) magnitude of preference, (2) contribution to a goal,
(3) individual priorities, and (4) relations. We contend these four categories actually
mark different functions of values and therefore are subsumed by Brown’s (2020)
typology.
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Guiding Ideals
Attributes
Institutional Structures
Ideologies-Value Systems-Worldviews, and
Facts.

Table 1 also describes and exempliﬁes each of these in relation
to CES. As Brown’s list illustrates, “values” in this functional sense is
an umbrella term that encompasses a wide variety of states and
structures that guide decisions, including preferences, desires,
goals, ideals, and ideologies. What matters in a functional view of
values is not so much what the value is about but how it impacts
one’s actions. For instance, values for immediate enjoyment could
change quickly with circumstances, but entire value systems have
immense inertia and will likely remain inﬂuential throughout the
project. Here, we adopt this ‘big tent’ conception of values as guides
for action not because we think that there are no important differences between, say, preferences and long-term goals, or
epistemic and ethical values. We emphasize function to highlight
their similarities regarding the challenges they pose for CES and the
mechanisms for answering those challenges.
Having deﬁned “values,” as used in this article, we must now
deﬁne “pluralism.” In this article, we focus on the type of pluralism
that arises from involving multiple people in a joint activity.
Certainly, individuals hold many values that guide their decisions
and actions, and these values can change with time and local
context; value pluralism within individuals is real and relevant in
CES.6 While we will touch on these dynamics and how they play in
team interactions, we focus on value differences arising from two or
more individuals. More formally:
Value pluralism is true within a team if and only if participants P1,
P2, .and/or Pn hold different sets of values in Situation Sn that
are relevant to their joint activity.7
There are at least two ways that sets of values can differ. First,
strong value pluralism arises when one member of the team values
something that another member of the team doesn’t value at all, or
even may disvalue; for example, perhaps P1 values deer welfare
while P2 doesn’t (maybe valuing legislative compliance instead)
(Davies & White, 2012). This form of value pluralism can be hard to
detect when two people refer to different things by the same valuelabel, e.g., sustainability as resource sufﬁciency vs. functional
integrity (P. B. Thompson, 2013). Second, weak value pluralism indicates that at least one of the values in the sets is weighted or
ranked differently than its counterpart in other sets, e.g., justice is
more important to me than it is to you. In short, two team members
may disagree about what is valuable (strong value pluralism) or
how valuable it is (weak value pluralism).
It may seem obvious to the most casual observer that value
pluralism is almost certain in a collaborative project given the diversity of people, activities, and situations involved. However, work
in cross-cultural psychology and sociology suggests that there is
considerable agreement across individuals and across countries in

6
On instability in economic valuations, see Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelac
(2006).
7
The deﬁnition offered here is an internal one focusing on values held by team
members. Since collaborative teams exist within broader structures (e.g., cultural,
institutional, moral) it is possible for there to be an external notion of values
pluralism in which team values differ from some prevailing institutional (e.g.,
university, IRB, funding agency, etc.) values. Because we are focused on team-based
interventions, rather than trace internal vs external values pluralism, we discuss
external value sources as part of the larger milieu of project constraints or deﬁnitions of success (see section 3.2).
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“basic values.” For instance, in their analysis of over 40,000 teachers
and students from 53 countries (Fischer, Vauclair, Fontaine, &
Schwartz, 2010), found an astonishingly high correlation
(r ¼ 0.98) between individual students’ and individual teachers’
responses to the Schwartz Value Survey, which is a psychological
measure of ten basic values such as Universalism (encompassing
welfare for all people and for nature), Benevolence (regarding with
the welfare of those with whom one often interacts), and Security
(including the safety and stability of society) (Schwartz, 1994,
2012). The upshot is that value pluralism may not be as common or
as serious in CES as we might expect it to be.
In response, we accept that collaborators may often share basic,
relevant values. However, we disagree that such situations necessarily avoid problematic value pluralism. People may agree about
basic values like human welfare disagreeing about non-basic values
and on how those values play out in speciﬁc contexts. For example,
to channel some work from empirical moral psychology, political
liberals and conservatives may assign similar weights to the value
of caring for others while having substantially different beliefs
about how to achieve, sustain, and promote care for others (J.
Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). This reveals distinct instrumental
values associated with care. Or consider a slightly different version
of the climate modeling example above. Let’s say both modelers
prize the welfare of future generations. They may still disagree
about how to implement that value in the model: should the discount rate be 1% or 3%? Because their values for implementing
future welfare are relevant to the project, even as they share a basic
value for future welfare, they still hold a plurality of values about
implementing it.
Moreover, other work provides indirect evidence there are wide
differences in values among CES participants. Empirical studies
exploring the philosophical commitments of practicing scientists
suggest that there are signiﬁcant differences among scientists.
Some of these differences track disciplinary boundaries, such as
views related to forms of scientiﬁc realism (Beebe & Dellsén, 2020).
And some track gender, including attitudes pertaining to values in
science (Steel, Gonnerman, & O’Rourke, 2017; Steel, Gonnerman,
McCright, & Bavli, 2018). This work suggests that there is a wide
variety of positions taken by scientists on the metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological dimensions of science qua science (B.
Robinson, Gonnerman, & O’Rourke, 2019). It would be surprising if
this variety were to stop at the borders of the more abstract philosophical dimensions of science, failing to extend to the values used
day to day.
3.2. Problematically plural values: causes & effects
Value pluralism can cause problems for CES projects when the
differences in values lead the team to undermine norms that deﬁne
project success, even the simple norm that the project should be
completed. In our view, some of these norms pre-exist a project
while others are created along the way. An example of a preexisting norm is that a CES project should produce new knowledge. In contrast, the kind of new knowledge that should be created
is a norm that typically the team develops as they work together.8

8
We thank one of our reviewers and an editor for noting that two dynamics
complicate the team’s ability to understand and fulﬁll these project norms. First,
norms can originate from external and/or internal sources. External norms are
harder if not impossible to change; below we mention at least one normdrespect
rather than oppressiondthat we believe holds regardless of project particulars.
Second, pre-existing and developed norms become harder to fulﬁll as the team
attempts to put pre-existing norms into practice. Layers of complexity are added,
for instance, if the team is required to implement a speciﬁc values solution (e.g., an
ethical framework) that is chosen before encountering actual values problems.
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Both pre-existing and developed norms can pertain to any
number of domains of activity, including the epistemic, social,
pragmatic, and moral. In this section, we describe both the causes
and effects of problems in these last two domains to illustrate how
differences in values, in general, can become problematic for
environmental science teams.9

3.2.1. Pragmatic problems
Pragmatic problems arise from value pluralism when the (strong
or weak) differences in values create conﬂict or confusion about
what to do to move the project forward. This includes cases where
proximate values prompt actions that could ultimately undermine
distal values. Let’s elaborate.
Brown’s recent work (2020) explains that, in many cases,
problems due to value pluralism arise from “pragmatic incoherence” (p. 130)dsituations marked by conﬂict or confusion about
what to do. Brown describes a ﬁrst kind of pragmatic incoherence:
The conﬂicts that arise in our everyday values are often not a
matter of logical contradiction, a direct conﬂict between
asserting and denying the same claim. Rather, the conﬂicts are a
matter of pragmatic incoherencedour values pull us in different
directions, suggest or demand different and incompatible
courses of action. (Brown, 2020, p. 130)
Here, Brown is picking out an instrumental or process problem
that can arise from value pluralism. As guides for action, differing
values often call for different actions. These different actions often
conﬂict if for no other reason than there is usually not enough time
to pursue them all. But they may also conﬂict because what they are
aboutdtheir topical contentdrequires conﬂicting actions.
For example, during the Flint Water Crisis, state-run environmental science prioritized somethingdperhaps simplicity, speed,
state control, or the appearance of compliancedthat was not
citizen health. The state’s motive(s) therefore rationalized using
fewer water samples than required, ignoring two lead-laden
samples, and disregarding citizen’s sensory observations
(Michigan Civil Rights Commission, 2017; Valles, Piso, & O’Rourke,
2019). Citizen scientists, however, prioritized citizen health,
which led that team to test more samples than required by law,
include all valid measurements, and heed citizen reports (Pieper
et al., 2018). While we cannot conclude the two studies valued
different things, it seems likely because they used directly
competing methods. Had these teams been part of the same
research project, the pragmatic incoherence of their diverging,
value-based methods would have created project problems,
perhaps resulting in a project split.
Continuing, Brown describes another form of pragmatic incoherence that occurs when the immediate course of action undermines our ultimate purposes: these are teleological problems of
value pluralism. A special case is when values don’t suggest an
immediate course of action at all, which clearly undermines future
goals. Brown continues from above,
There are other ways our values can be pragmatically incoherent
as well, when they fail to guide action at all or if they guide it to
results we ﬁnd inherently unsatisfactory. If it is ambiguous what
our values would have us do in a particular situation, or if we
lack valuations to guide any action whatsoever in a particular
case, we are in a situation of pragmatic incoherence. Our values

9
While pragmatic and moral problems are not the only kinds of problems that
value pluralism can cause, they are two common types that are receiving increasing
attention in team science and society at large and are thus worthwhile illustrations.

might be pragmatically incoherent in encountering certain
genuinely novel situations. If we act on our values and nonetheless regret our actions, this may [also] generate a state of
pragmatic incoherence. (Brown, 2020, p. 130)
Like any action agenda, CES projects are undertaken to accomplish some ultimate goal(s), in this case related to knowledge creation. If a team’s plural values fail to prescribe any sort of action
toward those goals, or if the actions ultimately undermine those
goals, then value pluralism has created pragmatic incoherencedactions (or inactions) have become incompatible with each
other. Brown notes that it is possible to be in a state of pragmatic
incoherence and not know it, realizing it only later when regret
strikes (p.131).
Data sharing in environmental science is a good example of
this kind of pragmatic incoherence, which is more subtle and
longitudinal than the direct conﬂict of actions described above.
Soranno, Cheruvelil, Elliott, and Montgomery (2014) argue that
environmental scientists have an ethical obligation to share their
data because they should make their discipline more inclusive.
However, data sharing is often delayed until the end of the project
and may not be anticipated despite requirements for data management plans. Moreover, pilot datadoften required to obtain
fundingdmay inadvertently anchor the project’s data in lessaccessible formats. Thus, it is not uncommon for data collection,
analysis, and storage to begin without the structure and metadata
ultimately needed to share the data; these must be added later.
Unfortunately, there is often little time and will to complete this
ﬁnal, onerous step even though it is a binding norm for the
project. Short-term success in getting the project off the ground
can therefore undermine long-term success in data sharing and,
ultimately, inclusive environmental science. The short- and longterm values are incoherent.
We follow Brown (2020, pp. 1e248) in calling pragmatically
incoherent situations caused by diverse values “values perplexities” (p. 134) because, as Brown observes, this term invites the
counterpart to perplexitydinquirydas a solution, which we will
explore in the last section of this article. Values perplexities often
arise and fade over time and in different parts of the project as
local situations change. For example, a set of values that wasn’t
relevant can become relevantdmaybe data collection requires
time away from home, which now involves my family values that
weren’t involved beforedor values can changedmaybe I now
enjoy virtual meetings more than in-person meetings because of
an ongoing pandemic. Thus, teams must constantly navigate new
value perplexities.
3.2.2. Moral problems
A second kind of problem can arise from value pluralism when
the values ultimately acted upon, or the actions or decisions that
they lead to, violate moral standards. To mirror the pragmatic
problems, we label these cases “moral incoherences,” caused not by
values perplexity but what we might call “values disorder.” One
example of moral incoherence in CES is what we call “research
oppression.” This occurs when powerful team members impose
their research values and consequent activities on less powerful
members who do not share those values for research. This imposition violates moral principles of individual and community sovereignty and of respect for persons. Speciﬁc research oppressions
include tokenism (S. M. Reich & Reich, 2006), participatory research
manipulation (Aldridge, 2015; Arnstein, 1969), disciplinary capture
(Brister, 2016), disciplinary chauvinism (Giri, 2002), and disciplinary policing (S. M. Reich & Reich, 2006), among others. Research
oppression is a problem caused by the conjunction of value
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pluralism and the wielding of power by some teammates over
others.10
This situation is, unfortunately, very common with certain
groups and perhaps even acceptable under views of research that
regard objectivity through empirical proof as the only sign of valid
knowledge. For instance, sustainability scientists increasingly
appreciate the informational value that Indigenous knowledges
provide but ignore the value of these knowledges for enabling the
sovereignty of Indigenous peoples themselves (K.-L. Thompson,
Lantz, & Ban, 2020; Whyte, 2017). This one-sided value transaction amounts to extracting and exploiting Indigenous research
partners. Whyte and many other Indigenous scholars and allies
have done extensive work in educating Western sustainability
scientists how not to oppress Indigenous scientists when partnering with them (Chief et al., 2015; Chief, Meadow, & Whyte, 2016;
Whyte, Brewer, & Johnson, 2015).
Another example of moral incoherence in CES is when researchers choose wrongly among their various values. This is not a
case of research oppression because the immorality of the choice
does not stem from imposing one’s choice upon others. Rather, the
chosen option itself is immoral. In these cases, the course of action
may be clear and consistent with other values in the project, and it
may have been adopted with team consensus; nevertheless, it is
the wrong thing to do. Because the moral problem here stems from
the implemented value itself, we call these moral incoherences
“research transgressions.” Research transgressions can, of course,
arise from a single, immoral value or a moral value with immoral
consequences. Important for this article is the fact that value
pluralism can complicate and amplify this problem. When there are
multiple values at play in a project, it is harder to identify consequences of the relevant values and to identify which values may be
causing the problem. Research transgression in CES is therefore a
problem complicated and ampliﬁed by the conjunction of value
pluralism and ignorance, vice, or akrasia (acting against one’s better
judgment).
For example, in the Flint Water Crisis, state-run regulatory science took scientiﬁc shortcuts and ignored citizen input, ultimately
poisoning the community (Valles et al., 2019). This simple summary
names three distinct research transgressions: (1) scientiﬁc shortcuts, (2) ignoring citizen input, and (3) poisoning the community.
The state had many values for their water studies, held by many
actors (e.g., lab technicians, state scientists, the emergency manager, the governor), each of whom was often aware of only their
part of the study. The diverse values distributed across a fragmented team created systemic ignorance and entanglement that
was driven by the vice of racism (Michigan Civil Rights
Commission, 2017), and this situation led the team to violate
moral norms binding the project.
To summarize, value pluralism can cause problems for CES
when the diverse values in play interfere with project requirements. We gave examples of both pragmatic and moral
interference, labeling their root value problems as values perplexities and values disorders, respectively. Values perplexities emerge
when diverse values cause pragmatic incoherencedconfusion
about what to do nextddue to uncertain or conﬂicting courses of
action. Values disorders manifest when diverse values cause moral
incoherencedviolation of moral principles either within or beyond
the team. The terms “perplexity” and “disorder” imply the violation
of an ideal arrangement (e.g., “actionable” and “morally ordered”)
of values constraining the project. That is, a problem occurs when
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Table 2
Five main strategies for addressing problematically plural values (PPV).
Strategy

Action

1. Give Up
2. Dodge
3. Select

Dissolve the team
Change context (e.g. what project the team is working on)
Pick a subset of values (in this case those of a single
individual or sub-group of the team)
Pick a subset of values (in this case many or most team
members ‘sacriﬁce’ some of their values).
Create a new set of valuesdwe call this integration because
we envisage the new values as growing out of the
combination and connection of existing team values.

4. Compromise
5. Integrate

the plurality of values leads to actions that fall short of project
ideals.
Generalizing from these illustrations, we see three possible
causes of problems with plural values in general. First, there may be
strong differences in values (differences in kind) between team
members or within a sequence of activities. Second, there could be
weak differences (differences in degree) in these same locations.
Third, there may be too many different values to coordinate
appropriately with the available resources. Each of these three will
likely lead to actions that fall short of project ideals, a situation we
here call problematically plural values (PPV). Nevertheless, PPV can
often be resolved or at least mitigated with strategic planning and
interventions, enabling CES collaborators to take advantage of the
beneﬁts of value pluralism while minimizing its harms.
4. What’s needed to resolve problems with value pluralism in
CES
Having identiﬁed PPV as an important (and under-appreciated)
barrier to successful CES, we now discuss how to overcome this
barrier. How, in short, can a team move from PPV to a set of
workable team values? We offer the following general account:
dealing with PPV has two steps. Teams need to (1) detect (actual or
potential) PPV, and (2) coordinate those values. Let’s take these
tasks in turn, breaking them into their elements.
4.1. Detecting problematically plural values
For a team to detect problematically plural values there are two
challenges: the team needs to (1) identify the ‘values in play’ and
then (2) determine if this set of values is (or could become)
problematic.
In an ideal world, the identiﬁcation part of the detecting task is
pretty straightforward: construct a list of the values each team
member holds that are relevant to the decision context. But in the
real world, making such a list is signiﬁcantly easier to say than to
do. This challenge is best described in terms of speciﬁc group tools,
so we will leave its discussion for sections 6 and 8.
Once a team has an inventory of relevant values, the next step is
to determine if that set of values is problematic. Do they generate
values perplexity, disorder, or other problems? If yes, then the team
is suffering from PPV. Since project contexts and collaborator values
change over time, relevant values and the actions they imply will
also change over time. The problemiticity of plural values rises and
falls at various points in a CES project, which can make its management quite difﬁcult.
4.2. Coordinating problematically plural values

10
Lisa Kretz (2018) proposes non-human life can also be oppressed. If so, CES can
also inﬂict research oppression on nonhuman lifedperhaps by poisoning it for an
experiment or exploiting it for materials.

To move forward, a team with PPV will need to address this
situation, either consciously or not. Doing so requires coordinating
the relevant values to enable project-appropriate team actions.
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Here, we identify ﬁve strategies for coordinating PPV and thereby
resolving the resulting problems (see Table 2).
First, sometimes the right response to PPV is to give up by dissolving the team. Some value conﬂicts are both deepdthe values in
question are (nearly) impossible to set asidedand widedthe
values in question activate in vastly contrary ways in many contexts. In such cases, breaking up can be a reasonable and fruitful
way to go, as exempliﬁed by the West End Revitalization Association’s decision to break ties with academic scientists (Heaney,
Wilson, & Wilson, 2007). This strategy targets the team itself as
the solution.
Second, sometimes the right response to PPV is to dodge the
problems by changing contexts. Changing contexts can alter which
values are relevant and/or how they are relevant. This strategy can
yield a situation in which plural values are no longer problematic.
For research teams a major determinant of context is the scope of
the project the team is working on. So, it may well be that a team
facing PPV should respond by making changes to their project such
as changing their research question, setting, or approach. This
strategy targets as the solution the context in which the team is
operating.
Third, the team could decide to select an intact subset of the
original values in play. In this strategy, some team members agree
not to act on some of their individual values during the joint
research project. Simply, those values are no longer in play. As a
result, the remaining collection of relevant values does not lead to
problematic situations. Which values are taken out of play and how
they are chosen matters (see section 5.2).
Fourth, the team could compromise, deﬁning a subset of values
in play that draws some values from everyone.11 In this case, no
single individual or subgroup gains or loses everything they care
about. Compromise is of course tricky to negotiate; we discuss
more in section 5.2.
Fifth and last, the team could integrate individual values to
create new ones. Team members can alter their existing values in
ways that respond to the values of their teammates and, with hard
work and a bit of luck, the team can end up with a collection of
values that is no longer problematic. Once again, the issue of which
values alter and the process by which that alteration takes place
matter. These last three strategiesdcompromising, selecting, and
integrating valuesdtarget changes to the values themselves in order to address PPV. All ﬁve strategies eventually coordinate the
values in play in such a way that they no longer cause problems for
the project.
If a team chooses not to give up or dodge and instead to select,
compromise, or integrate, then they must adopt a new set of plural
values that are not problematic. Our sense of how teams adopt new
values is quotidian. They ﬁrst gather to imagine, discuss, and
negotiate. Then they keep records of their decisions and commitments and work to live up to those commitments. Finally, they
check in with each other to make sure that their decisions are
working as intended. We formalize this quotidian process as 4
stages: (1) Articulating, (2) Recording, (3) Enacting, and (4) Evaluating. Articulating is the process of discussion and negotiation that
yields a statement of new team values. Recording involves creating a
stable, explicit, low-context (i.e., unambiguous) artifact that sets
out the team’s value commitments (e.g., a list of norms for the

11
What we’ve said about modifying values grows out of a sense that collections of
values can be thought of in ways parallel to sets of propositions. This is similar to
much of the work on belief revision (Hansson, 2017). If a set of propositions is
inconsistent (yields some form of incoherence in our framework) it can only be
rendered consistent either by removing propositions or altering propositionsdthe
two possibilities we consider above.

community/team). Enacting is the daily work of acting in ways that
are consistent with and informed by the values the team has
adopted. Finally, evaluation requires engaging in processes to test
that the team is (a) following the values and (b) that those values
are workingdthat hey lead the team away from any value perplexity or disorder, while providing guidance to team activities. But
again, as with “constructing a list” above, these practical steps are
easier to describe than implement. We discuss their practicalities
further below.
This brings us to the end of our general account of how to deal
with PPV. We’ve said a lot about what needs to happen to deal with
PPV but little about the how. We turn to that topic next. While there
are many strategies and tools research teams can use to resolve
PPV, we focus on a single approachdphilosophical dialogue interventions. As we will see, it is an approach realized in multiple
ways.
5. Philosophical dialogue interventions
In this section, we suggest that collaborators can go a long way
towards identifying differences in and implications of their
fundamental commitments, assumptions, and views by talking
about them. More speciﬁcally, philosophical dialogue that strives to
enhance self-, other-, and mutual understanding can unearth many
of the value differences found in CES teams and help determine if
these differences will cause value perplexities, disorders, or other
problems.
We focus on dialogue methods because they are a major form of
intervention discussed in the research collaboration literature
(McDonald, Bammer, & Deane, 2009). It is also a method we’ve long
examined and practiced ourselves as members of the Toolbox
Dialogue Initiative (Eigenbrode et al., 2007; Hubbs, O’Rourke, &
Orzack, 2020; O’Rourke & Crowley, 2013). We focus even more
narrowly on philosophical dialogue interventions to contribute to
the theory and practice of that form of engaged philosophy. Our
focus therefore allows us to build on our own expertise, learn from
and contribute to similar philosophical interventions, and specify
how our engaged work needs to improve.
5.1. Existing philosophical dialogue interventions
The relationship that philosophers have usually taken towards
the sciences is that of the passive observer. But in recent years, with
the emergence of forms of philosophy like socially engaged philosophy of science (Elliott, 2018), ﬁeld philosophy (Brister &
Frodeman, 2020), and applied philosophy of science (e.g.,
Wiegman & Mallon, 2017), there is increasing interest in philosophical reﬂection on the sciences that contributes to and improves
the sciences.12 One way in which philosophy of science may impact
science is by publishing in science journals, rather than only in
philosophy journals (Fehr & Plaisance, 2010). Another is through
philosophical dialogue interventions, a form of engaged public philosophy (American Philosophical Association, 2017).22
One form that a philosophical dialogue intervention may take is
that of embedded philosophy. A ﬁrst example comes from Nancy
Tuana’s work with climate scientists, policymakers, and stakeholders to develop descriptions of CRM strategies and decision-

12
For survey work supporting a widespread interest in philosophy of science of
this sort, see Plaisance, Graham, McLevey, and Michaud (2019).
22
Indeed, in 2018, the American Philosophical Association bestowed its Prize for
Excellence and Innovation upon the Toolbox Dialogue Initiative for TDI’s innovations in this type of work (https://blog.apaonline.org/2018/09/28/msustoolbox-dialogue-initiative-wins-the-2018-prize-for-excellence-and-innovation/).
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support tools for navigating these strategies. The results of Tuana’s
embedded efforts include scientiﬁc fruits. An example is an integrated assessment model that predicts the economic consequences
of aerosol geoengineering strategies (Goes, Tuana, & Keller, 2011).
The results also include philosophical payoffs, such as detailed
discussions of the ethical issues associated with aerosol geoengineering (Svoboda, Keller, Goes, & Tuana, 2011). What makes
Tuana’s embedded efforts qualify as a philosophical intervention is
that she shapes the collaboration so that attention is given to
philosophical dimensions of the problem. And what makes her
efforts qualify as a philosophical dialogue intervention is that this
shaping happens via dialogue.
Consider her work on coupled epistemic-ethical analyses
(Tuana, 2010, 2013, 2017). When used as a philosophical intervention in the workings of climate science and decision support
science, developing a coupled epistemic-ethical analysis involves
raising questions about and pointing out the ways in which
research decisions shaped by epistemic values (e.g., for highly
reliable forecasts) may lead to consequences that negatively impact
our moral and epistemic values (e.g., delayed advice that limits
effective climate action), and vice versa. Dialogue of this sort, which
involves placing research decisions into broader societal and
epistemic contexts, has “the potential to render transparent the
epistemic assumptions of the disciplines through interdisciplinary
interaction and provides opportunities to rethink values and assumptions embedded in these practices” (Tuana, 2013, p. 1959).
Valles et al. (2019) extend Tuana’s work into a four-question protocol that can directly guide team conversations or evaluations.
Tuana’s work engages the team in ongoing dialogue throughout
their project, which has unique beneﬁts for Tuana and the team.
The Socio-Technical Integration Research (STIR) approach led by
Erik Fisher is another example of ongoing philosophical dialogue
embedded in a team (E. Fisher & Schuurbiers, 2013; E. Fisher et al.,
2015). A different form that a philosophical dialogue intervention
may take is facilitating discrete dialogue sessions that are not quite
so embedded in the daily work of the team. These approaches also
have unique beneﬁts.
One example of a discrete philosophical intervention is values
inquiry (Brown, 2020). Brown’s version of values inquiry is
designed to address cases of “values perplexity” described above. It
employs moral imagination to develop a list of workable team
values as “hypotheses.” Brown’s book (2020) includes a worksheet
for guiding that discussion (linked in our Table A2) and guidelines
for using dramatic rehearsal and tentative application as tests of the
value hypotheses. We look forward to more accounts of how these
discrete dialogue sessions work for science teams.
Another example of a discrete philosophical dialogue intervention comes from the Toolbox Dialogue Initiative (TDI) (Hubbs
et al., 2020). Since TDI is a widely deployed form of philosophical
intervention,13 and because it is an intervention with which we are
intimately familiar, we emphasize it in what follows. TDI, formerly
“The Toolbox Project,” emerged as a response to problem with
communicating across disciplines (Hubbs, 2020). Its central insight
is that many problems associated with communicating across the
disciplines are partly rooted in philosophical differences
(Eigenbrode et al., 2007; Hubbs et al., 2020; O’Rourke & Crowley,
2013). Scientists, whether in the environmental sciences or not,
each enter into research collaborations with many commitments,
assumptions, and views. Some of these are metaphysical (e.g., What
is nature?). Others are epistemic (e.g., Can we come to an adequate
understanding of an ecosystem through reductionism?). And yet

13
Since 2005, TDI has carried out over 360 workshop interventions across the
world.
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others are moral, ethical, and social (e.g., Are biological entities
morally valuable independent of human interests?). A scientist’s
prior and fairly long-standing epistemic and non-epistemic values,
functioning in various ways, play key roles in these domains.
However, scientists often leave their philosophical views implicit
during their work, which can hinder the resolution of any problematic value pluralism.
The Toolbox approach to surfacing these commitments consists
of the Toolbox instrument used in the Toolbox workshop (O’Rourke
& Crowley, 2020). The instrument contains a series of dialogueprovoking statements, or prompts, organized into clusters of six
or seven statements, or modules. Each module centers a core
question such as the ones listed just above. Although the precise
details of the instrument will vary depending on the group for
which it was designed, all Toolbox instruments aim to highlight
several families of philosophical issues that are important to the
team’s project. To illustrate, consider the Values module in the most
frequently used instrumentdthe scientiﬁc research instrument
(Looney et al., 2014; Hubbs et al., 2020, Appendix A).14 It opens with
the core question, “Do values negatively inﬂuence scientiﬁc
research?” The ﬁve prompts invite participants to explore their
commitments regarding aspects of this theme by registering their
level of agreement or disagreement on a ﬁve-point Likert-style
scale with additional “I don’t know” and “N/A” options. For
example, Values prompt 3 reads, “Value-neutral scientiﬁc research
is possible.”
There are many considerations that go into the design of a
Toolbox prompt. Primary among these is its ability to spark rich,
helpful dialogueddiscussion that unearths philosophical differences among collaborators (Rinkus, Donovan, Hall, & O’Rourke,
2020). To this end, Toolbox prompts sometimes propose strong
positions (e.g., that value-neutral science is possible) and often
house contested, ambiguous, or vague terms (e.g., “advocacy”,
“human construction”, and “uncertainty”). Each module in the
scientiﬁc research instrument ends with a “similar views” prompt,
“The members of this team have similar views concerning [this]
core question.” It is designed to encourage both individual and
team metacognition.
After completing the Toolbox instrument on their own, workshop participants are encouraged to discuss their responses to the
prompts and core questions. A member of TDI lightly facilitates
discussion through the instrument, but the group decides which
prompts they would like to discuss and for how long. Indeed, the
discussion candand often doesddeviate from the particularities
found on the instrument. One advantage of a light facilitation
approach is that it helps to ensure that the discussion is about the
team, and not the facilitator (O’Rourke & Crowley, 2013). It gives the
team autonomy to pursue issues that seem most important to
them. The overall goal of the dialogue is for participants to identify
and articulate their views about philosophical issues relevant to
their joint project, including issues related to values and science.15
5.2. Ideals for philosophical dialogue interventions
Since philosophical dialogue interventions are supposed to be
helpful for resolving PPV, we should be explicit about what counts

14
The full scientiﬁc research Toolbox instrument is available under a creative
commons license as Appendix A in Hubbs et al. (2020).
15
Under our IRB approval and with participant consent, TDI records the audio
from most workshops. For excerpts of workshop transcripts, as examples of the
types of dialogue TDI promotes, see Looney et al. (2014), O’Rourke & Crowley,
(2013), Laursen (2018), (2019b), Rinkus et al. (2020), and Hubbs O’Rourke, &
Orzack, (2020) among others. TDI welcomes collaborators interested in analyzing
our data.
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as “helpful help.” Of course, we would like to see a particular
outcome: movement towards workable team values. But we also
have expectations for the process of getting there. This is one limit
on our own pluralism about legitimate values in CES, closely tied
with our prohibition of research transgressions, above. We propose
that the process of resolving PPV, like the process of CES itself,
should be governed by the ideals of democratic experience and
communication as expressed by John Dewey, Iris Marion Young,
and pragmatist-feminists who emphasize the necessity of mutual
respect and empathy in group life. Space prohibits a full exposition
of this family of thought, so here we present Ferkany and Whyte
(2011) discussion of participatory virtues as a guiding vignette of
that literature.
Ferkany and Whyte propose that public deliberation of environmental problems must not only be structured well, participants
must also behave well in those structures according to habits (of
mind, heart, and deed) that promote respectful, effective deliberation in such contested spaces. These habits they call participatory
virtues, of which they name 11, including Friendliness, Dependability, and Attentiveness. These virtues, they argue, will help
secure an inclusive, engaged, epistemically productive discoursedthat is, one marked by the pragmatic resolve and moral
concern we introduced above.
CES is one arena in which such environmental deliberation takes
place (albeit, one more centered on knowledge than policy decisions) and therefore CES should be governed by these participatory virtues. The model we proposed above for stages needed to
resolve PPV in environmental science teams marks the structure of
the deliberation while participatory virtues and similar ideals for
engagement16 mark the process of deliberation, viz., how participants should engage in it. Thus, any attempt to resolve PPV is
governed by at least three sets of goals: the outcome (resolution),
the structure (our two-stage model), and the process (virtuous
participation).
6. The roles of philosophical dialogue interventions in
detecting PPV
6.1. Philosophical dialogue can help teams detect PPV
Detecting PPV is the ﬁrst stage of resolving it. Recall from section
4 that in order to detect problems arising from plural values, the
team must ﬁrst identify relevant values and then determine if they
are problematic. Philosophical dialogue interventions can help with
both stages and do so in a democratically virtuous way. First, when
it comes to identifying personal or team values, the dialogue can
help make those values more introspectively available by focusing
discussion on values questions.
When an environmental scientist is prompted to articulate her
value commitments perhaps by an embedded philosopher like
Tuana or by the prompts on a Toolbox instrument, it is generally
expected that she will try to express her commitments so that her
audience can understand them (Gonnerman, O’Rourke, Crowley, &
Hall, 2015), especially since they are her collaborators and she thus
has some obligation towards them (Brister & Frodeman, 2020).
Meeting this expectation requires that the speaker clarify her
commitments to herself well enough that she can express them
adequately. She may use inner speech to work towards this clarity
(Morin, 2011). The clariﬁcation may also happen through external

16
These include “mutual respect” and “equal communicative freedom” (Bächtiger
et al., 2018 Table 1.1). Beierle (2002) adds that intensively involving all stakeholders
in environmental decision making fosters these ideals and therefore should be an
ideal itself (Elliott, 2011).

dialogue. When a speaker is unclear about her value commitments,
dialogue can prompt further reﬂection on the matter through
questions or challenges from her fellow collaborators. Challenges,
in particular, encourage the speaker to specify the reasons behind
her values or how they apply in the decision context at hand. So
long as the challenge gives rise to a disagreement that is collaborative and not adversarial (Laursen, 2018; O’Rourke, Hall, & Laursen,
2020) and as long as the disagreement doesn’t end prematurely
(Crowley, Gonnerman, & O’Rourke, 2016), improved selfunderstanding emerges from a better understanding of what
grounds the value and the ways in which it may be challenged.
Clarity during a philosophical dialogue intervention might also
emerge from the elaborations that others offer of the speaker’s
contributions (O’Rourke et al., 2020).
Collaborative exchanges pertaining to individual value commitments also foster group-level understanding of the individuals’
values in play. Such exchanges can can promote collaborators’ understanding of the speaker’s values, especially when they are
accompanied by Patience, Persistence, Charity, and Generosity
(Ferkany & Whyte, 2011). What emerges, then, out of such collaborative exchanges are two key ingredients for mutual understanding (Crowley & O’Rourke, 2020) or common ground (Beers,
Boshuizen, Kirschner, & Gijselaers, 2006; H. H.; Clark, 1996;
Stalnaker,
2002):
(1)
Self-understanding
and
othersunderstanding, and (2) Appreciation of this work undertaken by
the others. That is, (1) I now understand my position and so do you,
and (2) I’m aware that you understand my position and you’re
aware that I understand my position. These two levels of bidirectional understanding together increase individual and group
Reasonableness (Ferkany & Whyte, 2011). This is a complex, interwoven foundation of group knowledge and virtues upon which the
team can build in later stages of resolving PPV.
6.2. Philosophical dialogue does help teams detect PPV
Thus far we have provided only theoretical arguments that
philosophical dialogue interventions can help environmental science collaborators identify their value commitments. To close
section 6, we present empirical evidence that such interventions do
help achieve this goal in many respects, though not all. We
emphasize TDI data mostly because it is the only mode of philosophical intervention that we know of that has systematically
collected data for assessing its effectiveness over multiple years and
in multiple contexts. It has also commissioned an external evaluation in 2017 that augments these internal data.
Toolbox (TDI) workshops typically collect three streams of data:
(1) pre- and post-workshop quantitative responses to prompts on
the Toolbox instrument, (2) transcripts of the workshop dialogue,
and (3) quantitative responses to workshop evaluation surveys
completed two weeks after the workshop experience. Each data
stream provides some reason to think that TDI interventions help to
support the advancement of mutual understanding among teams
of diverse collaborators.
Robinson & Gonnerman (2020) analyzed the pre- and postworkshop quantitative responses for evidence of mutual understanding. They used participant responses to the similar-view
prompts described above. Not only did Robinson and Gonnerman
witness a substantial decrease in “I don’t know” responses to these
prompts from before to after the workshop, they also report evidence that the dialogue improved the accuracy of these responses
post-workshop. In other words, the data that they analyzed suggests that Toolbox dialogue interventions tend to advance self- and
other-understandings of the philosophical commitments found on
the teamdthe basic ingredients of mutual understanding. This
conclusion is reinforced by an external evaluation of TDI. It found
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that after the workshop, 83% of the evaluation respondents felt they
were better able to identify their own research worldviews, and
75% of respondents believe they are better able to identify research
worldviews expressed by others (Watts, Means, & Perk, 2017).
Rinkus & O’Rourke (2020) add to the evidential story by examining the second stream of TDI data: transcripts. They examined six
dialogues and revealed rich conversational patterns that exhibit
both self-examination of one’s own philosophical commitments
(what they dub “reﬂexivity”) and perspective taking of others’.
Finally, as regards the post-workshop evaluation surveys, thematic analyses revealed that over 80% of the respondents had
indicated that the philosophical dialogue during the TDI intervention improved their awareness of the knowledge, opinions, or scientiﬁc approach of their teammates (Schnapp, Rotschy, Hall,
Crowley, & O’Rourke, 2012).
Moreover, there is some reason to think that TDI nurtures these
gains in self and team understanding in ways that tend to uphold
participatory virtues like Sincerity (Ferkany & Whyte, 2011) and
democratic structures like freedom of communication (Bächtiger,
Dryzek, Mannsbridge, & Warren, 2018). The external evaluation
found that 93% of their respondents agreed they “felt free to present a view that was different from others in [their] group," and 89%
agreed the “conversation was an open exchange of thoughts and
ideas” (Watts et al., 2017). This openness translates to workshop
engagement: 89% of evaluation respondents remember most people participating in the conversation.17
Thus, we see strong evidence that TDI helps collaborators
identify their value commitments. But what about determining if
those commitments are problematic? How capable are philosophical interventions when it comes to determining whether the
values found on the team could lead collaborators towards incoherent or disorderly research decisions? We have less evidence of
TDI’s effectiveness in this respect.
Because TDI has focused on helping collaborators articulate
their views using the abstractions of philosophy (Crowley,
Eigenbrode, O’Rourke, & Wulfhorst, 2010), TDI supports the identiﬁcation of values more than the analysis, comparison, and
implication of those values in context, which is the work needed to
determine if team values are, or could become, problematic.
However, even without strong facilitation toward this end, teamwork in identifying values naturally increases the likelihood team
members will do that determining work anyway.
Participants usually open their dialogues on any topic by
comparing each others’ quantitative responses to the Likert style
prompts (e.g., “Oh, I put a 3 for the ﬁrst prompt; what’d you put?“).
This leads to mutual understanding by comparison (Rinkus et al.,
2020). We frequently observe elaborations on previous points and
co-constructions of meaning (Rinkus & O’Rourke, 2020), as well as
challenges and argumentative exchanges (Laursen, 2018). Earlier
versions of the Toolbox approach used open-ended questions
(Eigenbrode et al., 2007). Experience with this format revealed that
Toolbox participants were reluctant to engage with open-ended
questions. The result was a workshop exercise in which commitments were not explored to the extent they could be. The Likertlike responses seem to encourage discussion through (mostly
friendly) disagreement (Rinkus et al., 2020). Such comparison is a
promising ﬁrst step to detecting problematic values that could be
extended with stronger facilitation, more prompts about concrete

17
Unfortunately, none of these agreement rates were 100%, showing we still have
work to do in ensuring a welcoming environment for all participants at all times.
Evaluation respondent comments indicate Toolbox facilitators need to facilitate
more strongly in this respect to, as one respondent wrote, “restrain the more
obnoxious [participants] from dominating discussions.”
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actions (which TDI has started to use; Hubbs, O’Rourke, Eigenbrode,
Rinkus, & Malavisi, 2020), and/or the use of additional tools, which
we will discuss later.
And we must admit that, despite its strengths, TDI is not the
panacea for identifying relevant values, either. A 90-minute discussion is unlikely to fully reveal one’s values, especially when
those values are implicit and dynamic. Moreover, while Toolbox
instruments often do include prompts designed to get at participant values (e.g., “Bridging science and policy should be a top priority of research on large water basins”), any one instrument is only
going to explore part of the entire values landscape that may
impact the project. Moreover, instruments are often designed in
collaboration with team leaders, but topics salient to team leaders
may not be the ones important to other team members. And projects often shift. Discrete dialogue sessions like Toolbox workshops
necessarily face these limitations. And in this respect, dialogue that
fails to surface a relevant value difference is a dialogue that fails to
determine whether the difference is problematically plural.

7. The roles of philosophical dialogue interventions in
coordinating PPV
To resolve PPV, it is not enough to detect the problematic values;
a team must go on to coordinate them into workable team values.
What role can philosophical dialogue interventions play in that
task?

7.1. Philosophical dialogue can help coordinate PPV
In section 4, above, we mentioned ﬁve basic strategies for
coordinating PPV: (1) give up, (2) dodge, (3) select, (4) compromise,
and (5) integrate. Here we focus on the power of philosophical
dialogue interventions to help with this last strategy of integration.
Of all ﬁve strategies, we emphasize integration because it is the
hardest case and one necessary for inter- and transdisciplinary CES..
We argue if philosophical dialogue can help teams integrate their
values, it can also help with the other four strategies as appropriate
for the context.
In section 4 we also labeled four necessary steps for coordinating PPV if a team chooses not to give up or dodge: (1) articulating the new set of values, (2) recording the decision, (3) enacting
the new values, and (4) evaluating that enactment. There are
several reasons for believing philosophical dialogue interventions
like the Toolbox could aid integration in each of these steps,
although we will see the potential is strongest for articulating and
evaluating.
At the start of the articulation phase a team has a set of clearly
stated problematic values. At the end of this phase they will have an
equally clear but no longer problematic set of values. How does this
happen? In the case we’re considering the new team values are the
result of integrating the original values. We understand this using
our preferred model of integration, the IPO model (O’Rourke,
Crowley, & Gonnerman, 2016). According to the IPO model the
general phenomenon of integration can be understood by focusing
on inputs (I), process (P), and outputs (O). Applying the IPO model
to team values integration, it is clear what both the inputs out the
outputs will be (problematic and resolved value differences,
respectively).18 The mystery then is the process.

18
Work on the nature of integration is ongoing and hardly a settled matter. We
draw your attention to Holbrook (2013) for an important early summary of work in
this area and to Laursen (2019b), O’Rourke et al. (2019), and O’Rourke & Robinson
(2020) for some recent developments in the area.
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According to the IPO model, the main action in the integrative
process is the use of an integrative relation.19 Examples of integrative relations include sequencing, emergence, nesting, and subordination. In terms of logic, these are relations that combine two or
more inputs into fewer outputs without deleting any of them
(O’Rourke et al., 2016). In terms of cognition, they are ways of understanding that reveal meaningful, coherent connections between
entities (e.g., theories, models, data structures, values, etc) that had
seemed unrelated or incompatible. Earlier, we named two examples of such mismatches: values perplexities and values disorders.
If one is trying to resolve a mismatch, a valuable ﬁrst step is to
frame itdto ﬁnd or create a model or framework in which the
mismatched entities can both be expressed. To a large extent, the
challenge of engaging with a complex system, especially an environmental system that spans multiple disciplines like climate
change, coastal fog, or human-induced species extinction, is forging
the tools for relating things that have yet to be recognized as related
and for marking out possibilities for navigating and modifying the
system. This may be, in part, why some interdisciplinary scholars
say that integration requires the construction of a shared language
(Klein, 2014). A shared language, through an expanded vocabulary,
is a tool for relating the unrelated. And it may also be why pragmatist insights on language get such a grip in interdisciplinary
studies. These insights emphasize “languages’ attunement to
different possibilities of action to suit different needs and interests,”
especially in complex, real-world systems (Piso, 2016, p. 52). Here,
the complex system we are considering is a set of PPV in a CES team
project. Language can thus be a powerful tool for relating these
values by representing the mismatched values as differing choices
within a shared action context.
Philosophical work suggests at least two approaches to framing
mismatched values: hierarchical taxonomies and reﬂective equilibrium. The ﬁrst of these grows out of the tendency of philosophers
to organize values into hierarchical taxonomies (Mason, 2018). We
proposed two of these early in this paper: topical and functional
types of values. There are others (Dietz, Fitzgerald, & Shwom, 2005;
Schwartz, 2012; Tadaki, Sinner, & Chan, 2017). What matters for our
purposes is that a taxonomy provides a framing structure. Tuana’s
coupled epistemic-ethical analysis and Brown’s moral imagination
framework are two such framing taxonomies used to start the
dialogue of how new values could interact if the team adopted
them. The frame is not only a conversation starter, it is also a
negotiation aid. If the values causing challenges for a team all fall
within a single category, then they can be seen as different realizations of the underlying (or overarching) category. Shared
frames thus support the classic negotiation technique of emphasizing shared interests (ultimate values) rather than different positions (instrumental values) (R. Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2011).
Hierarchical taxonomies aren’t the only framing tool philosophy
provides for teams negotiating mismatched values. For Catherine
Elgin (2005), drawing on the work of Rawls, values are parts of
practices which themselves are networks of mutually supporting
factors. In Wittgensteinian language, they are elements of “forms of
life,” which are “the ways that social practices are organized and
social goals are prioritized” (Piso, 2015, p. 32). Practices themselves
can stand in need of justiﬁcation and that justiﬁcation comes from a
process of reﬂective equilibrium in which the practice is evaluated
as a part of a system of commitments. In this frame, how to think
about a value depends on whether it is doing its part to support a
practice which is itself justiﬁed by being part of a system in
reﬂective equilibrium. Toolbox instruments can support this sort of

19
This is intended as an illustrative rather than an exhaustive account of integrative relations.

systems thinking by including several prompts under a single core
question, but Tuana’s and Brown’s approaches speciﬁcally target
value interactions. It is likely Fisher’s STIR philosophers also ask
these systems-level questions during their midstream modulation
of scientiﬁc projects (E. Fisher & Schuurbiers, 2013). In using philosophical taxonomies, however, it is key that dialogue facilitators
weave closely between these categories, which are usually foreign
to a scientiﬁc team, and the team’s daily practices; the meta-level,
philosophical deliberation must gain meaning from application in
the team’s practice, not from academic philosophy (Piso, 2015).
So, philosophical dialogue interventions can support integration
by providing language and value frames to aid discussion. However,
these interventions, especially the Toolbox approach, have little
potential to help with recording group value decisions or enacting
these. After all, dialogue is about talking, not recording or putting
into action. We note, of course, that talking is an action and team
values will have implications for how the team holds future conversations. Philosophical dialogue is distinguished by using some
level of abstraction that tends away from the speciﬁcs of enacting
values in context. Thus, while there is some potential for philosophical dialogue to return as a form of enacting values, this is not
its main strength. When it comes to recording the team’s decision
about which values to adopt, philosophical dialogue interventions
will fall short because spoken words are ephemeral.
However, philosophical dialogue can play a larger role in evaluating how well the team is enacting their values. This is because
the act of evaluating a team’s value-driven actions is, in fact, to
reiterate the early stage of detecting PPV. And above we saw that
philosophical dialogue interventions provide excellent support for
that work.
7.2. Philosophical dialogue does help coordinate PPV
Little empirical work documents if and how well philosophical
dialogue interventions actually promote values integration. In TDI,
that initial work is positive. Bethany Laursen and Michael O’Rourke
have reported several instances of integration in Toolbox transcripts and they continue to hunt (Laursen, 2018; Laursen &
O’Rourke, 2018a; 2018b; 2019a; 2019b). Their work builds on unpublished analyses of conversational threads in six Toolbox transcripts that, while being coded for participant engagement (see
report in Rinkus & O’Rourke, 2020) also informally noted many
“integrative moments” that have yet to be fully analyzed. And no
work has yet identiﬁed if these moments integrate values specifically. So, while we have leading evidence that Toolbox workshops
do help teams integrate, it remains to be seen if the dialogues
speciﬁcally aid the articulation of new, workable sets of team
values. But as with detecting problematically plural values above,
the Toolbox has strong potential to aid this sort of articulation given
more targeted facilitation, integrative prompts, and the use of
complementary tools. Indeed, we are developing taxonomies of
integrative communication (O’Rourke & Robinson, 2020) and
integrative relations (Laursen & O’Rourke, 2018a; 2019a) that could
eventually shape Toolbox instruments and facilitation so they
frame workshop dialogues not only as values identiﬁcation but also
as integration.
We can speak with more conﬁdence about the Toolbox’s performance in recording new team values: the answer is, “Very little.”
Audio recordings may capture such teamwork, but given our own
difﬁculties in parsing our transcripts, it seems unlikely the audio
recordings (or transcripts) would be of much use to a team in this
regard. Toolbox facilitators have more recently added “co-creation”
activities to the end of dialogue sessions to start teams on the road
to integration and enacting (O’Rourke & Crowley, 2020), but these
activities are usually quite brief (10 minutes) and are limited to ﬂip
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charts or surveys that record a brainstorm rather than a full decision. Clearly, there is potential here for other recording tools.
Translating the Aha! moments of self- and other-understanding
and even integrated team articulations into scientiﬁc collaboration
practices has proven difﬁcult for TDI, because this is just not a
strength for dialogical modes. As just mentioned, the co-creation
activities aim to jumpstart the enactment of any new consensus,
but we have not evaluated the extent to which this works. We have
seen some generally positive signs with 64% of our external evaluation respondents agreeing “The activity improved collaboration
in my group” and 74% agreeing it improved the group’s communication (Watts et al., 2017). Toolbox has also begun using more
concrete, action-speciﬁc prompts in recent workshops to facilitate
team movement to action, but again, effects are unknown. In interviews, our external evaluation respondents noted the dialogue
session is not enough; they asked for other tools that would help
them “deal with their own [research] traits and beliefs” and those
of others after those had been identiﬁed and articulated in the
workshop (Watts et al., 2017).
Toolbox has had only a few opportunities to help a team revisit
topics raised in earlier workshops.20 However, most of these have
not prompted evaluation of past value-driven actions; rather they
have explored new topics or recurring topics more deeply. With a
little rewording and facilitation, however, the Toolbox instrument
could easily support the kind of evaluation needed to detect any
problematic values that have come up since a previous decision
about team values.
While Toolbox potential and actual performance in helping
teams coordinate their problematic values is still mostly unknown,
we do know that Toolbox and other discrete dialogue interventions
will never be able to ensure complete enactment of values, even the
participatory virtues we expect to see in our workshops. This is
because enacting a values change (as with altering a habit) takes
thought, repetition, and forgiveness of failure over long periods.
However, regular, thoughtful dialogue can play a signiﬁcant role in
building the sort of relationships between team members that
allow for the learning process involved in changing values
(O’Rourke et al., 2020). For example, the task of enacting shared
values is supported by the affective bonds between team members
that are enriched by meaningful conversation.
To sum up, philosophical dialogue can be at the core of dealing
with PPV but it needs to be ongoing rather than one off, and it needs
to be supplemented with activities that support recording, enacting, and evaluating values solutions.
8. How to improve philosophical dialogue interventions to
better resolve PPV
So far, we have shown that the Toolbox Dialogue Initiative excels
at identifying many of the values relevant to a CES project, offers
some help in determining if values are problematic, and only lightly
touches the task of coordinating the problematic values. Embedded
approaches such as Tuana’s and STIR likely have a different proﬁle;
with their extended engagement, we would not be surprised if
these approaches focused just as much on identifying relevant
values as determining any incoherencies for the project. But their
effectiveness for facilitating workable team values appears unknown, at least in print.
Regardless of the speciﬁc intervention, our discussion has made
clear that philosophical dialogue can facilitate some values work
well, some not so well, and still other work rather poorly. This is

20
We are working to expand our longitudinal work with teams (Eigenbrode,
Vasko, Rinkus, Laursen, & O’Rourke, 2020).
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simply the nature of such dialogue. Philosophical dialogue, in our
experience, emphasizes clarity of thought and expression, which
plays well to the identifying task. It also emphasizes tracking implications, which can (depending on the kinds of implications being tracked) help identify values that will eventually lead to
problematic actions; Brown’s values inquiry is an example of a
philosophical dialogue intervention that does ask such questions.
What philosophical dialogue does not do well is implement values
solutions.
To be more speciﬁc, when it comes to the ﬁnal stage (coordinating PPV), these interventions could aid the team in the ﬁrst step
of articulating a set of values for moving forward. However, if they
lean heavily on the disagreement framework often present in
Western philosophy, they will mostly support those strategies that
end up with winners and losers, namely selecting or compromising.
Brown’s approach to values inquiry avoids this win-lose mentality
by promoting imaginative dialogue that can support the articulation of new, workable sets of team values. Interventions that don’t
emphasize disagreement but don’t aim for integration either will
often allow the team to give up or dodge their values problemsdat
least, for the duration of the dialogue. This has been the mood and
mode of TDI with its emphasis on mutual understanding and not
mutual action. TDI and perhaps other such interventions have shied
away from facilitating values integration, leaving that work up to
other forms of team communication and collaboration at other
times and places. There can be good reasons for this choice. But,
even if philosophical dialogue interventions pushed integration as
a strategy, on its own, philosophical dialogue does little to assist the
remaining stages of coordinating PPV, viz., the need to record,
enact, and evaluate the team’s chosen set of values.
Fortunately, one of the good reasons that dialogue might eschew
any attempt to help teams address problematic values unearthed in
the dialogue is that there are other team process tools that excel
with this task. They can be undertaken separately or woven into the
dialogue. Doing so will take facilitativedand not clearly philosophicaldskills. Intervention teams that lack this skill will need to
partner with those that do, so that the team becomes a blending of
experts just as the intervention becomes a blending of approaches.
We describe over a dozen of these complementary tools in the
article’s appendix. Here, we note three features these tools tend to
have that makes them good complements to philosophical dialogue. First, they creatively structure participation (Lipmanowicz
& McCandless, 2014). That is, these tools go beyond designating
someone a facilitator and leaving the rest as generic ’participants’:
they also require particular steps, group arrangements, and distributions of participation. These design choices not only encourage
integrative thinking but also equitable participation, a deliberative
ideal of which philosophical dialogues can fall short if they use too
little or too much facilitator power.
Second, many tools center on some kind of external representation or recording of the group process and decisions. Visual,
audio, tactile, or other representations are not only more lasting
than spoken words, they also add to expression by using more
channels of communication. While dialogue must always add some
form of recording, many other tools have it baked in.
Third, these tools emphasize experimentation. As Brown
(2020) reminds us, problems of value are often not solved immediately or once and for all. Rather, they require testing, adjustment,
and re-testing. It is partly their dependence on external representations that leads these tools to support experimentation.21 After
all: how many times do we ever get our writing, drawing, acting,

21

On the role of external representations and artistic creativity, see Clark (2001).
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etc. the way we want it the ﬁrst time? The push to externalize
creates a de facto push to iterate.
Lastly, we want to note that these other tools are not the only
resource we have for improving our philosophical dialogue interventions. Additionally, different dialogue approaches can complement each other, and examples of this strategy are also included
in the appendix. We believe much synergy could result from smart
combinations of TDI, values inquiry, STIR, and coupled ethicalepistemic analysis. We challenge ourselves and our colleagues to
explore these options more intentionally.

9. Conclusion
The ﬁrst half of our article contributes to the philosophy of
values in science by offering the following model of how problematically plural values (PPV) are resolved in teams, speciﬁcally of
environmental scientists:
1. DetectiondDoes your team suffer from PPV?
a. IdentiﬁcationdWhat values do members of the team bring to
the table?
b. DeterminationdDo those values yield incoherence?
2. CoordinationdWhat can your team do about PPV? A team can
give up or dodge at this stage. If it chooses to continue by
addressing its values (select, compromise, or integrate), then the
steps become
a. ArticulatingdCoordinating a set of shared values
b. RecordingdMaking a record of those values
c. EnactingdCarrying out those values
d. EvaluatingdMaking sure the values are in operation and are
effective

The model is grounded in both academic literature and our own
experiences. Thus, we turned to those experiences to test our
model in the second half of our article.
This latter portion contributed mainly to the practice of engaged
philosophy by discussing a single mode of engaged philosophy
practicedthat of a philosophical dialogue interventiondthat both
tests the model through application and assists science teams
through the intervention itself. By applying our model to these
interventions (speciﬁcally, the Toolbox Dialogue Initiative), we
were able to pinpoint some of the strengths and shortcomings of
philosophical dialogue as an intervention that could help resolve
PPV for environmental science teams. The fact that our model was
useful in this regard gives us more reason to believe it is an accurate
sketch of how to resolve PPV in CES. In the end, however, we
prioritized the beneﬁts of the analysis for scientiﬁc practice and not
philosophical knowledge by highlighting a dozen tools that could
make philosophical dialogue interventions more effective for
resolving values-driven team problems. We look forward to additional theorizing and practicing.
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Appendix.

Table A1
Detecting PPV in single dialogue interventions
Activity

Description

Values Related
Contribution

Citation

URL

Blend with another
philosophical
dialogue technique

E.g., Tuana et al.‘s coupled
ethical-epistemic analysis

Tuana (2013); Valles et al. (2019)

NA

Reﬂect!

Argument mapping customized
for synthesizing perspectives
on wicked problems

Hoffmann (2020)

https://reﬂect.gatech.edu/

MentalModeler

Free, online, intuitive software
for mapping systems, including
systems of values and resulting
actions.
Process that uses special tactile
objects to identify
collaborators’ interests and
contributions
Facilitates a dialogue to identify
the questions, ideas, and
arguments that structure a
problem, and visually maps it
A game with physical pieces
that prompt storytelling
Questions based on Critical
Systems Heuristics that help

Determines if problems
will arise from
epistemic, ethical, and
coupled epistemicethical values.
Explicitly structures the
relations between
concepts - improving
identiﬁcation and
detection.
Also a great tool for
Representing when you
are working on
coordinating PPV
See Reﬂect!

Gray, Gray, Cox, & Henly-Shepard
(2012)

http://www.mentalmodeler.org/

See Reﬂect!

Lindvig, Hillersdal, and Earle (2018)

https://conavigator.org/

See Reﬂect!

Conklin (2006)

http://www.cognexus.org/id41.htm

See Reﬂect!

Kurtz (2014)

https://www.narratopia.com/

Supports deliberative,
democratic

Pohl (2020); Williams &
Hummelbrunner (2009)

https://zenodo.org/record/3717029

CoNavigator

Dialogue mapping

NarraTopia
Emancipatory
boundary critique
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Table A1 (continued )
Activity

Ethical matrix

Description

Values Related
Contribution

less powerful collaborators
investigate the impacts and
driving values of decisions
made by more powerful
collaborators
Mode 1: Collaborators record
their speciﬁc values for each of
several categories of values.
Mode 2:
Collaborators record value
impacts of a chosen course of
action for each stakeholder.

participation. Identiﬁes
values in play and
Determines if their
resulting actions are
problematic.
Deciding which values
form the column
headers supports
values Identiﬁcation.
Stakeholders can
include all
collaborators, which
supports democratic
dialogue. Mode 1
supports values
Identiﬁcation. Mode 2
helps Determine if any
values-based actions
are problematic. Can
also support
perspective taking.
Detects problematic
actions likely to result
when adopting that
value. Two or more
maps can be compared
to detect incoherences
between values.
Identiﬁes values in play
by Identifying their
opposites
Identiﬁes speciﬁc
values in play for
deliberative team
process
Supports Identiﬁcation
of one’s own values and
supports perspective
taking (see Perspective
Taking)
Alternative to dialogue
for noticing what’s
important to you and
others thus improving
Identiﬁcation. Can also
be helpful in
developing ideas as
part of the articulation
phase of Addressing.
Supports better
Identiﬁcation and
Determination of
problematic actions..
Also a valuable resource
for Articulation and
Evaluation phases of
Addressing
Can excavate deeper
values, identify ties
between values and
actions, and support
deliberative,
democratic team
engagement. Also
supports perspective
taking (see perspective
taking) by clarifying
one’s own perspective.

Futures/implications
wheel

A brainstormed mind map that
starts with a single (set of)
values and records possible
action-implications of it, up to
however many layers of
implications is helpful.

Triz

The group brainstorms “What
would be the worst ____ ever”

Heard, Seen, Respected

Pairs break out from the
plenary to take turns sharing a
time they felt heard, seen, &
respected.
Any technique aimed to still the
frenzied (individual or group)
mind to allow masked thoughts
and desires to surface

Mindfulness exercises

Arts-based exercises

Any technique aimed to
support authentic expression of
oneself

Perspective-taking
exercises

Any technique aimed to
understand another’s view or
experience

Reﬂexivity exercises

Any metacognitive technique:
carefully considering patterns
and processes in one’s own
actions

Citation

URL

Forsberg (2014); Mepham, Kaiser,
Thorstensen, Tomkins, & Millar (2006)

NA

NA

https://www.mindtools.com/pages/
article/futures-wheel.htm

Lipmanowicz and McCandless (2014)

http://www.liberatingstructures.com/
6-making-space-with-triz/

Lipmanowicz and McCandless (2014)

http://www.liberatingstructures.com/
19-heard-seen-respected-hsr/

NA

https://positivepsychology.com/
mindfulness-exercises-techniquesactivities/

Klammer (2017)

https://coursecraft.net/c/
expressiveartsfacilitation/splash

NA

NA

NA

NA
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Table A2
Detecting PPV in ongoing dialogue interventions
Activity

Description

Values Related Contribution

Citation

URL

Blend with another
philosophical
dialogue technique

E.g., conduct a Toolbox
workshop as part of a STIR
project

Fisher and Schuurbiers
(2013)

NA

Create & revisit team
ground rules

Team ground rules are valuesbased expectations for
behavior.

NA

NA

Team & personal
coaching

Coaches use incisive questions
to help teams and individuals
discover their values
A team science process expert
will monitor and help the team
evaluate underlying values and
alignment with actions
Dialogue mapping without
dialogue facilitation, only
mapping
Online tool for conducting
Participatory Narrative Inquiry
on teams

Blends unique beneﬁts of each
technique, e.g., focused
Identiﬁcation of values within
ongoing Determination of
problematic values
Forces Identiﬁcation of values
and resulting actions. Can
Determine any conﬂict in
expectations, even as they
change over time.
Facilitates Identiﬁcation of
values in play.

Whitworth, KimseyHouse, Kimsey-House,
and Sandahl (2018)
Bammer (2013);
Hendren & Ku (2019)

NA

Executive scientist/I2S
specialist/
community manager
on the team
Issue mapping

NarraFirma

Facilitates Identiﬁcation and
Determination of values
conﬂicts

NA

Over time, can track the values
in play and implied or resulting
actions to Detect PPV.
Identify values and their
impacts over time as part of a
research project.

Conklin (2006)

Kurtz (2014)

http://www.cognexus.
org/issue_mapping_
faqs.htm
https://narraﬁrma.com/

Table A3
Coordinating PPV during discrete dialogue interventions
Activity

Description

Values Related Contribution

Citation

URL

Values inquiry

A dialogue investigating which
values should be adopted in a
situation using moral
imagination, dramatic
rehearsal, and tentative
application, among other tools
A visual or tangible
representation of how a project
works

Brainstorms and tests
implications of possible sets of
values that could Address PPV

Brown (2020)

https://www.
matthewjbrown.net/
professional/book/
worksheet.pdf

Values can be included in the
diagram to Articulate &
Represent how they drive
actions.
Creating a manifesto will help
the team identify coherent
values. The manifesto itself is a
Representation that will aid the
Enacting & Evaluating parts of
coordinating PPV.
Supports Enactment and
Evaluation of the new values.

Rogers (2017)

NA

Bell (2015)

NA

Lipmanowicz and
McCandless (2014)

http://www.
liberatingstructures.
com/24-what-i-needfrom-you-winfy/

Helps all stages of coordinating
PPV by identifying which items
need more speciﬁcity,
discussion, information, etc.
and which are ready to go.
Helps Enact and Evaluate new
values by looking at team
interactions

Lipmanowicz and
McCandless (2014)

http://www.
liberatingstructures.
com/27-agreementcertainty-matrix/

Lipmanowicz and
McCandless (2014)

http://www.
liberatingstructures.
com/26-generativerelationships-st/
https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/valuepluralism/#PraWis

Theory of change or
Logic Model

Manifesto

A strong, clear, usually public
statement of values

What I need from you

Participants ask for what they
need from others to enact a
speciﬁc goal. The other
responds unambiguously to the
request.
Maps values or actions on two
dimensions: level of agreement
and level of certainty.

Agreement/Certainty
matrix

Generative
relationships

Wise advisors

Super value scale

Minimum allowable
roles for values

Collaborators identify current
team performance along four
dimensions and identify
strengths and weaknesses
Aristotelian virtue theory
argues only a wise person will
know what to do in any given
situation. Advisory boards or
mentors can play this role.
A scale that superordinates all
values and prioritizes them in
relation to each other
A meta-value about the
minimum roles values should
play in the project

The advisor will Articulate the
values the team should Enact.

Mason (2018)

Sets up a common framework
to aid Articulation of a new set
of workable team values
Identifying minimum roles is a
starting point for Articulating
new values

Mason (2018)

Douglas (2009)

https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/valuepluralism/#SupSca
NA
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Table A4
Coordinating PPV during ongoing dialogue interventions
Activity

Description

Values Related Contribution

Citation

URL

Executive scientist/I2S
specialist/
community manager
on the team
Memorandum of
understanding
Collaboration plan

A team science process expert
will monitor and assist with the
entire process of coordinating
PPV
An ofﬁcial document solidifying
working relationships
A comprehensive document
deﬁning expected team process
& products

Support for the entire
Addressing process

Bammer (2013);
Hendren & Ku (2019)

NA

Authorship guidelines

Principles, rules, or criteria for
how to qualify as an author on a
team manuscript

Articulates & Represents
ongoing Enactment of values
Articulates and Represents
adopted values for all areas of
teamwork. Aids Enactment &
Evaluation.
Helps enact values for
contributing to the work

https://www.cscce.org/
what-is-communityengagement-withinscience/
NA
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